

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

HOW THE 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION WILL TRANSFORM  
TO MEET THE NATION'S STRATEGIC POSTURE AS DEFINED  
IN THE ARMY'S CAMPAIGN PLAN BY 2008

by

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## ABSTRACT

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The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) directs a force sized to defend the homeland to deter forward in and from four regions, and conduct two, overlapping "swift defeat" campaigns. Even when committed to a number of lesser contingencies, the force must be able to "win decisively" in one of the two campaigns. This "1-4-2-1" force sizing construct places a premium on increasing innovation and efficient methods to achieve objectives. The construct establishes mission parameters for the most demanding set of potential scenarios and encompasses the full range of military operations. The thesis of this paper will be solely focused on the force generation and transformation aspects of the military forces of the 36th Infantry Division in the state of Texas. I will look at the proposed force sizing and design as provided by the Army's Campaign Plan and how the 36th Infantry Division will complete their transformation and be ready by fiscal year 2008 while sourcing a myriad of CONUS and OCONUS deployments.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .....	vii
HOW THE 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION WILL TRANSFORM TO MEET THE NATION'S STRATEGIC POSTURE AS DEFINED IN THE ARMY'S CAMPAIGN PLAN BY 2008 .....	1
<b>U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY &amp; NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2004 U.S. ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>NATIONAL GUARD 2005 POSTURE STATEMENT .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>PROPOSED OPERATIONAL TEMPO FY 05 AND 06.....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>STATE MISSIONS .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>IMPACT OF STRATEGIC ENDS .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS.....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>CONCLUSIONS.....</b>	<b>13</b>
ENDNOTES .....	15
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	17



## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1 "CURRENT" 36 <sup>TH</sup> ID FORCE STRUCTURE" .....	7
FIGURE 2 "PROPOSED" 36 <sup>TH</sup> ID FORCE STRUCTURE" .....	8



## HOW THE 36TH INFANTRY DIVISION WILL TRANSFORM TO MEET THE NATION'S STRATEGIC POSTURE AS DEFINED IN THE ARMY'S CAMPAIGN PLAN BY 2008

As the United States recovered from the Election 2004 rhetoric, Yassar Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) passed away leaving the Arab Israeli talks in limbo, President George Walker Bush focused on establishing his cabinet for his second term and the seizure of Fallujah that will help pave the way for elections to be held in Iraq in January 2005. Amidst all of the turmoil, the United States military forces found themselves in various phases of transformation, either deployed to a theater for Major Combat Operations (MCO), returning from a MCO, or getting ready to go.

The events of 11 September 2001 have changed the way Americans look at Homeland Security. For the first time since 7 December 1941 the United States has suffered a major attack on its soil by an enemy that did not represent a nation-state or fight by traditional or symmetrical doctrine as we in the military had been trained to fight up through the end of the Cold War. This faceless enemy was that of international terrorism and had struck at the heart of elements of national power within America, sending shock waves throughout the world.

Those events of September 11<sup>th</sup> have served as a catalyst that has driven the Department of Defense into a transformation frenzy. President Bush has added a new cabinet position, the Department of Homeland Security for Secretary Tom Ridge. Department of Homeland Security helped pass the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act.<sup>1</sup> The Department of Defense began to change as well. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) became the new unified command and would conduct Operation Noble Eagle in the United States, while Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The latter eventually led to regime change in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States engaged the military forces in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) with no short term victory in sight.

At the signing of the FY 02 Defense Appropriations Bill on 10 January 2002, President Bush said, "This nation must have ready forces that can bring victory to our country and safety to our people. . . . My administration is committed to transforming our forces with innovative doctrine, strategy and weaponry. This will allow us to revolutionize the battle field of the future and keep peace by defining war on our terms. . . . We will build the security of America by fighting our enemies abroad, and protecting our folks here at home. And we are committed. . . . to these most important goals."<sup>2</sup>

Many senior leaders took the President's comments to heart and acted in kind to start the transformation process. Transformation had become the 'vogue' term within the Pentagon and

the Department of Defense. General Eric K. Shinseki served as the Chief of Staff of the Army during this period and just three years earlier had already catapulted the Army into change that was built around three main themes: Readiness, People and Transformation.<sup>3</sup> General Shinseki aimed at insuring that the Army would be an equal partner and key player in the joint team. The results from Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom reinforced the fact that airpower is a useful tool, but the United States must possess forces that actually can occupy ground or liberate countries. That remains the role for the Army.

General Shinseki felt that in order for the Army to be a relevant joint player in future wars, the Army would have to first transform its existing 'Legacy Force' to an 'Interim Force' and then a final phase, to the 'Objective Force'.<sup>4</sup> Recently, General Peter J. Schoomaker, current Army Chief of Staff, has stayed on the same glide plane as that of his predecessor but the terminology is somewhat different. General Schoomaker sees the transformation of forces as a continuum being categorized as the Current Force, Modular Force and Future Force. This Army vision looks to current technology that will enable future capabilities that will not only be relevant in today's GWOT fight but tomorrow's as well.

#### **U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY & NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**

The September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks on American soil were the nexus for the Global War on terrorism (GWOT) which laid the foundation for the existing National Security Strategy (NSS). The current NSS has caused the Department of Defense to re-look all of its departments from the top down. This top down reengineering is called transformation and is designed to enable the Department of Defense to better meet the threats of the asymmetrical foe we fight today. There is no department or agency within the Department of Defense that is excluded from the scrutiny of change and / or modularity. The Army National Guard is one of the many organizations within the nation's strategic reserve that will transform as well. The Army National Guard has been engaged in operations from 11 September 2001 till now. These operations have run the span of Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Army National Guard has once again demonstrated why it is a formidable force and is worthy to be considered as the nation's strategic reserve.

The National Security Strategy provides the necessary guidance in a format of ends, ways and means for the military forces to meet its requirements. As part of this guidance, the National Security Strategy references certain core values for democracy as components of the National Security Strategy. These include the principles of political and economic freedom;

peaceful relations with other countries; and respect for human dignity.<sup>5</sup> The ends for these core values are: Defend the peace, Preserve the peace, and Extend the peace.

It seeks to accomplish these through three concepts: *Defend*: Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism, Prevent threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and Defuse regional conflicts. *Preserve*: Cooperation action with other powers. *Extend*: Champion human dignity, Global economic growth and Expand circle of development.<sup>6</sup>

It accomplishes these concepts through the careful implementation of the various elements of national power, with the underlying theme of readiness and transformation. This is accomplished through: *Intelligence, Diplomacy, Public Information and the Military*.

From the National Security Strategy, one can then assess the current National Military Strategy (NMS) in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that was signed 30 September 2001. The Quadrennial Defense Review lays the foundation for a paradigm shift in force planning and this paradigm is a new force-sizing construct that specifically shapes the forces to:

- Defend the United States;
- Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions;
- Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts – including the possibility of regime change or occupation and;
- Conduct a limited number of smaller scale contingencies operations.

In doing so, the Department of Defense must maintain sufficient force generation capability and a strategic reserve to mitigate risks.<sup>7</sup> The 2004 National Military Strategy refers to the above force sizing as simply the “1-4-2-1” force sizing construct, which places a premium on increasingly innovative and efficient methods to achieve objectives which are boiled down to the following:

- Defend the Homeland;
- Deter forward in and from four regions;
- Conduct two, overlapping “swift defeat” campaigns;
- Even when committed to a limited number of lesser contingencies, the force must be able to “win decisively” in one of two campaigns.<sup>8</sup>

## **2004 U.S. ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT**

General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army stated clearly, "Our Nation, and our Army, are at war. It is a different kind of war, fought against a global terrorist network and not likely to end in the foreseeable future."<sup>9</sup> General Schoomaker lays out the two core competencies for the Army as: Training and equipping Soldiers and growing leaders and providing relevant and ready land power to combatant commanders as part of the joint force. He goes on to assert that the military must remain agile and have an expeditionary mindset.<sup>10</sup> General Creighton W. Abrams remarked after the Vietnam War when only 3,000 reservists had been called up, that "America should never go to war without calling up the spirit of the American people, and you do that by calling up the National Guard and the Reserves."<sup>11</sup> This became known as the Laird Total Force Policy or informally as the Abrams Doctrine. Americans must have gotten the message. In order to provide relevant and ready land power to the Combatant Commanders and the Joint Team which included meeting the global commitments across the full spectrum of military operations, our Army has mobilized more than 164,000 Reserve Component Soldiers of which more than 96,000 National Guard soldiers have been mobilized for duty in both CONUS and OCONUS in support of the Global War on terrorism (GWOT).<sup>12</sup> Due to the increased OPTEMPO for the Active force, the National Guard has seen an increase in deployments for Peacekeeping Operations to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the increase in deployments, the National Guard is transforming as well. In just one instance, the Army Guard has provisionally organized eighteen additional military police (MP) companies. This reorganization was in an effort to help reduce the personnel tempo of the active force military police.

## **NATIONAL GUARD 2005 POSTURE STATEMENT**

The Army National Guard is unique in that it has a dual mission requirement to both the State and Federal government which causes the Guard to report to the Governors of their respective states and the President of the United States. The Guard's Charter is the Constitution of the United States. Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution contains a series of "militia clauses," vesting distinct authority and responsibilities in the federal government and the state governments. These clauses and follow-on congressional legislation have sculpted the Guard as you see it today.<sup>13</sup>

As of May 2004, the Army National Guard owns 3,150 facilities across 2,700 communities, totaling eight divisions and seventeen separate brigades with a total force of 350,000 guard men and women. By the end of fiscal year 2004, the Army National Guard will comprise 53 percent

of the Army's combat, 34 percent of the Army's combat support, and 38 percent of the Army's combat service support forces. Overall, it will possess 38 percent of the Army's Force structure.<sup>14</sup> The National Guard will remain, first and foremost, a provider of ready, trained, and equipped warfighting units to Combatant Commanders through the Army. It is from this increase in OPTEMPO that the Army Guard must change its Cold War training paradigm from a "Train, Alert, Mobilize, Train and Deploy" mindset to "Train, Alert and Deploy" if they want to maintain the relevance that we have earned for over 365 years as the country's Minuteman militia.

Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, is transforming from the top down by starting with the way the headquarters does business. . . . Joint. National Guard Bureau has reorganized from three separate organizations to one joint organization effective 1 July 2003. This reorganization flattened the organizations, making it more efficient, capable, and aligned its staff functions and responsibilities with those staffs of the Army, the Joint Staff and combatant commanders. Staff transformations then took place at the state level. The State Adjutants General consolidated 162 State headquarters organizations into fifty-four doctrinally aligned Standing Joint Forces Headquarters – creating, effective in October 2003, a single joint force headquarters in each state for all Army and Air Guard activities.<sup>15</sup>

To meet the requirements laid out in the Army Posture Statement of 2004 the Army Guard will focus on three main themes with corresponding sub-goals. The first theme is Support the War Fight with the sub – goals of The Guard Oversees; Readiness of the Force; mental and dental readiness; training soldiers and growing leaders; Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and National Training Centers (NTCs); Joint Readiness training Centers (JRTC); Combined Arms Center (CAC); force – on – force training; recruiting and retention; Army National Guard full – time support; Army National Guard well – being; diversity initiatives and equal opportunity. Second main theme is Homeland Defense that includes domestic operations; missile defense and continuity operations as sub – goals. The last main theme for the Guard is Transformation for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, which includes force balance and restructure; high demand units; modular units; force modernization; Army National Guard Aviation modernization and transformation; information operations; logistics and equipment; environmental programs; part of the joint force; predictability for our soldiers; home station mobilization; strategic readiness system; personnel and human resources as the sub - goals.<sup>16</sup>

It is the last theme, "Transformation for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" where I will spend the rest of this paper discussing how Texas' 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division will transform to meet the goal of the Army by 2008. On 1 July 2004 Texas re-flagged its division from the 49<sup>th</sup> Armored Division to the 36<sup>th</sup>

Infantry Division. The 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division traces its lineage back to World War I and combat in World War II. As America fights this Global War on Terrorism, Texas thought it made sense to transform the division to a lighter force structure and bring back the "T Patch" for a division that had successfully fought against tyranny. The 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division was one of eight Army Guard Divisions that began transformation long before the reflagging ceremony.

As with most organizational changes, the division generated a vision or mission statement. It is the nexus for the change in which the organization uses as its litmus test. Task Force Modularity was the organization that the Chief of Staff, Army charged with the Force Structure designing of the Units of Employment - Y (UEy), Unit of Employment - X (UEx) and Units of Action / Brigade Combat Teams (UA/BCTs). General Schoomaker gave the following mission statement to Task Force Modularity:

***"MISSION: Create a modular "brigade-based" Army that is responsive to the regional combatant commander's needs, better employs Joint capabilities, facilitates force packaging and rapid deployment, and fights as a self contained unit in non-linear, non-contiguous battlespaces."***<sup>7</sup>

Based on the above Chief of Staff approved mission statement from Task Force Modularity and the Title 32 state requirements that the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division has for Texas, Major General Michael Taylor, Commanding General, developed and published a Commander's Intent to his staff for them to use while they developed their possible Force Structure Courses of Action (COAs). As part of the mission analysis process for the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division's staff, they gained agreement from General Taylor on the following Problem Statement: "How to place and staff units of the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division from the current configuration into the new configuration of one UEx, two Infantry UAs, one Aviation UA, one Support UA, and one Fires UA."<sup>18</sup>

In addition to the Problem Statement, the division staff wanted to provide General Taylor with some additional background information before he crafted and issued his Commander's Intent. The Background information that was provided to General Taylor for his consideration was the following:

***Leaders and Soldiers Are and Will Remain the CENTERPIECE of our Force:***

- *Adaptive and innovative*
- *Competent with technology and enhanced equipment*
- *Battle-focused Leader/Soldier training*
- *Organized to win the tactical fight.*<sup>19</sup>

Now that the staff had developed a Problem Statement, collected some specific background information and given it to General Taylor, he issued the following commander's intent, key tasks and end state:

Purpose: The purpose of this planning process is to apply a practical solution to restructure of the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division from its current configuration to match Active Duty Force Structure and ensure continued viability of the Division for future State Active Duty (SAD) missions and Federal deployments.

Key Tasks:

- Identify locations that will demographically support the new unit structures.
- Minimize soldier turmoil by requiring minimal travel and/or reclassification of Military Occupational Skills.
- Utilize existing infrastructure.
- Locate subordinate organizations as close as possible to parent headquarters.
- Limit the number of detachments.
- Attempt to have a presence in all geographic regions of the state.

End State: 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division reconfigured to one UEx and five UAs by FY-07, positioned to take advantage of existing facilities and demographic support for sustainment.<sup>20</sup>

Once the staff had the approved commander's intent from General Taylor they had to start transforming the existing Force Structure to the proposed one UEx and five UA configurations. *Figure 1* below depicts the current task organization of the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. The division is comprised of the traditional Legacy Force Structure mainly comprised of the M1A1 main battle tank and the M2A0 Bradley fighting vehicle.




FIGURE 1 "CURRENT" 36<sup>TH</sup> ID FORCE STRUCTURE"

Figure 2 below depicts the proposed Force Structure that the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division will transform to by FY-06 as per the commander's intent provided by General Taylor:




FIGURE 2 "PROPOSED" 36<sup>TH</sup> ID FORCE STRUCTURE"

#### PROPOSED OPERATIONAL TEMPO FY 05 AND 06

The 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division was not unlike other National Guard units when on September 11, 2001 the nation asked it to respond to the unknown threat of terrorists and where they may strike next. Texas responded within hours to the Trade Center attacks by mobilizing several hundred soldiers to reinforce the security at over twenty airports in the Lone Star state. This increased operational tempo has not slowed. Every infantry battalion has been mobilized at least once as have most battalions within the state with no end in sight. As the National Guard Bureau continues to respond to the needs of the regional combatant commanders, states like Texas have to step up to the plate as Texas will continue to do. The following Federal Deployments are what is known at this time. Dates are left off for obvious reasons and unit names will only be given if they have been released by the state's Public Affairs Officer (PAO):

- One Brigade Combat Team (56<sup>th</sup> BCT) will deploy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom – FY 05. The 56<sup>th</sup> BCT has been identified as the first brigade to go through transformation to the Unit of Action (UA) Force Structure upon its return in late FY 06. The soldiers within this unit have received many of the individual equipment upgrades

from the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) but the majority of the transformation will conclude upon the return of the unit to CONUS.

- One Infantry Battalion (+) will deploy In Support of Operation Enduring Freedom – FY 05. This Infantry battalion is organic to the 72<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team that will complete its transformation after the 56<sup>th</sup>. This Infantry Battalion like the 56<sup>th</sup> BCT will receive the upgraded individual equipment that is provided through the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI).
- One Engineer Battalion (386<sup>th</sup>) has already completed its Mission Rehearsal Exercise and has been certified to deploy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 4. This battalion will support the upcoming rotation with the 42<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division.
- One Main Support Battalion (MSB) will deploy in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom – FY 05. Receiving equipment issue as well, from the Rapid Fielding Initiative, it is currently part of the Division's Support Command (DISCOM) but upon its return to CONUS will be part of the sustainment brigade depicted in *Figure 2* above.
- Command and sizeable Staff will deploy in support of the Balkans operation for KFOR and provide the infrastructure for Task Force Falcon. The deployment will start with a train up phase that will start Summer FY 05, Command Post Exercises – Fall FY – 05 and culminating with a Mission Rehearsal Exercise that will take place OCONUS early CY – 06.

With the possibility of additional deployments, the above five deployments are for the most part set and are the Federal deployments that both the division and state staff's are working on at the present time. In addition, the transformation and other various State missions exist that may come up when called upon by the Governor of the state of Texas.

## **STATE MISSIONS**

Unfortunately the majority of the State Missions Texas is involved in cannot be planned but are inevitable. Like most of the Gulf Coast states, Texas has more than its fair share of hurricanes which result in heavy rains, inland flooding and evacuation and support to the Department of Public safety for security missions. Texas' military forces bring an enhanced capability for the Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) equation. The Texas military forces are a self-contained and self-supporting organization that has the operational capability to augment all of the State organizations as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

Disasters and emergencies, natural and manmade are increasingly capable of causing mass casualties and infrastructure damage within in Texas and the rest of the U.S. thus disrupting the day to day operations of the economy and the active duty forces. These events represent a significant challenge to civilian government resources, and the Texas military forces should expect civilian authorities to often request appropriate consequence management (CM) support. For the most part, I have been describing natural disasters and their impacts but the national strategy definition found in the Homeland Security Policy states: *Homeland Security – A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to Terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.*<sup>21</sup>

The support to homeland security is a mission the active army has been performing for over 227 years. The National Guard has been upholding this mission since its inception over 365 years ago, tracing its lineage back to the first militia forces discussed earlier in this paper. Some of the Civil Support or Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) missions that Texas has been involved in this last year and will continue to stand ready to support are; Space Debris Impact; Counter Drug Operations; Critical Infrastructure Protection; Hurricanes; Flood; Snow storms; Chemical incidents; and others.

#### **IMPACT OF STRATEGIC ENDS**

The 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division meets the needs of Governor Rick Perry and President George W. Bush. As the 'hammer' for the state of Texas' military force, the division received the majority of both the federal and state missions because of its current Force Structure. Despite the current and planned deployments for the Texas Military Forces, the state has been able to keep 50 percent of the force ready for possible State Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities missions unlike other states in the U.S.

The transformation of the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division into brigade sized units will support the mission statement that was provided by General Schoomaker to the Modularity Task Force as well. By transforming to forty-three brigade sized Units of Action, the Army is planning to reduce the time frame between rotations of active forces and will cut down the rotations of Guard units to once every six. The Army's Force Generation program is a structured process that will provide trained, ready and cohesive units for regional combatant commanders. As part of the Army Force Generation process, the National Guard will go through a six year cycle with the units being in one of the following categories: reset/trained, ready, or available. While in the "reset/trained" category a guard unit would be responsible for Title 32 missions, Homeland Defense and Homeland Security for a period of two years. Then that same unit will be part of

an enhanced pool of units “ready” where they would receive enhanced training and resources and could deploy only after the deployment of “available” units had been exhausted. The period that a unit could be set in the enhanced pool or “ready” would be for a period of two years. After being in the enhanced pool of units for the requisite period of time, a unit is placed in a “ready” pool of units where they could or could not be “mobilized and deployed” for a period of twelve to eighteen months. Just because a unit is in this category doesn’t mean that unit would necessarily deploy. It means that as a regional combatant commander requested a certain force package, a unit set in the deployment “queue” would be the first to go. This unit would not have deployed for the last four to five years. Once the period of twelve to eighteen months had ended, whether the unit had deployed or not, it would go back to a “reset/trained” status and focus on Title 32, Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions for a period of two years.<sup>22</sup>

With the transformation of the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, will come several enhanced mission capabilities. Soldiers will have the latest in individual protection equipment; communications equipment; more wheeled vehicles versus the preponderance of the fleet being tracked; leader and senior non-commissioned officer training in a joint environment; units that are capable of working in a self-contained and non-linear area of operations. The ability for the Texas Military Forces to provide some level of predictability to the soldiers, their families and their employers is greatly needed and should be attained at some point in the future once the transformation has been completed. There are several enhanced mission capabilities that will be realized for federal missions and / or deployments in addition to the above that will transform to the needs of the active force but largely the transformation will provide brigade sized units of action for the needs of the various regional combatant commanders. The ability for combatant commanders to have full spectrum forces that are brigade size units; are self-contained and that can be deployed into a theater of non-linear operations should provide greater flexibility and more predictability to the Nations’ Ready Reserve Forces.

Benefits above and beyond the discussed State and Federal mission capabilities are the ability to enhance skills of the individual soldiers so that upon their return and demobilization, they can get higher paying jobs within their communities. Recruiting and retention for the Guard could stabilize or gradually increase by having a more predictable force deployment schedule like those that are currently planned for OCONUS rotations in support of KFOR missions in the Balkans and MFO missions in Sinai, Egypt.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division should request that the National Guard Bureau establish its Training Requirements Oversight (TRO) relationship to five units of action as soon as possible. As a UEx, the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division could have training oversight of up to five units of action. With the success that the division has had from its deployment in support of Stabilization Forces (SFOR 7) and the close proximity of the 155<sup>th</sup> (Heavy) BCT that is planned for in Mississippi and the 45<sup>th</sup> IN (Light) BCT that is currently in Oklahoma, it would make sense that a feasible argument could be made for those two brigades to be part of the training oversight requirements responsibility of the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division as a UEx. Especially since it looks like Texas will get four artillery battalions: two towed howitzer battalions and two multiple launch rocket (MLRS) battalions and the headquarters and headquarters battalion probably remaining with the 45<sup>th</sup> Fires Brigade in Oklahoma.

Next, Texas should do everything it can to get all or part of a Maneuver Enhancement (ME) Brigade. The maneuver enhancement brigade's headquarters could be constructed from the personnel who are 'currently' part of the division's engineer brigade headquarters and the rear area operations center (RAOC). As I look at the current and proposed force structures, it is not clear what has happened to the three engineer battalions, one being currently deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition to the engineer assets that normally come as part of the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, there could be a MP battalion or at least one to two companies of Military Police; and one company of chemical personnel that could leverage the existing personnel that are part of the state's Civil Support Team (CST). Also many of the state missions could and have required the use of engineer support that ranged strictly from personnel to the use of their heavy construction equipment. Since the brigade combat teams of the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division will be "Light" Infantry, the Engineer Company that is organic to the Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) will be light as well and have only six engineer squads and light equipment. Light engineer equipment is great but the fielding of a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade could provide not only armored vehicle launched bridges AVLBs for use but dozers, dump trucks and other pieces of construction equipment that could be necessary during consequence management operations. Lastly, a Military Police Battalion of one to two companies of Military Police (MP) that is normally assigned to a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade could be critical in state consequence management missions. These Military Police unit (s) could be readily assessable for the National Guard Reaction Forces that National Guard Bureau has said each state is required to have in place. In addition, they would be available for Military Assistance to Civil Authority missions. On a Federal mission side, they could provide

additional force protection to enhance the ability of the division operationally along major supply routes (MSRs) in theaters, as well as security missions within the sustainment operations area for the division.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

The question is no longer “if” the National Guard will be deployed, it’s more a matter of ‘when’. One of Secretary Rumsfeld’s key mandates to the Services is to find ways to make the National Guard more ready and accessible in its federal warfighting role.<sup>23</sup> To do this the National Guard Bureau has been working with the Army and Joint Forces Command to dramatically improve the way that units are mobilized and demobilized using the current four-phased process. Under the current guidelines, it could take several weeks or months to prepare an Army National Guard unit to mobilize and deploy – compared to the Air Guard model where units deploy in a matter of hours or days.<sup>24</sup> The National Guard has historically been a “Train, Alert, Train, Certify, Deploy force” but need to move more towards a ‘Train, Alert, Deploy force’. As goes the Army must go the Army National Guard units and it has been decided that the old divisional structure is no longer feasible in today’s asymmetrical fight, therefore, the National Guard Bureau will continue to work closely with the Army to meet the expectations that were provided by Secretary Rumsfeld. The Army National Guard is a community-based military organization and, as such, is prepared to assist cities and towns in times of natural or man-made disasters. Army National Guard Soldiers are Citizen-Soldiers, and recognize that they must fulfill dual roles as ordinary citizens and as members of the Armed Forces of the United States.<sup>25</sup>

The initial priority should be for the National Guard Bureau to identify their units in the ‘Army Force Generation Model’ which would categorize units as “Reset/Trained, Ready or Available” deployment schedule. This initial step would have a cascading effect from identification of Units of Action that would be susceptible to a Request For Forces (RFF) request from the regional combatant commanders, down to the units within the states that would be expected to support state missions for disaster recovery or National Guard Reaction Forces / Consequence Management missions.

To meet the guidance of Secretary Rumsfeld, Texas’ 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division is well on their way in the transformation process that will result in their meeting the FY ’08 time schedule outlined by National Guard Bureau and the Army. The ability for the state of Texas to support the division’s transformation will enable the state to have more flexibility in supporting both state and federal missions. The sooner National Guard Bureau can identify the units in the ‘Army

Force Generation Model' the quicker it will provide some level of predictability, resulting in the following impacts for the individual Army National Guard units. First, providing some level of deployment time frame could create adverse stress in a soldier's family resulting in negative retention and recruiting. The support of a soldier's family is important during their deployment and their possible consideration of reenlistment as well would provide a negative voice in the soldier's community. Next, is the positive support the citizen-soldier receives from his or her employer today. The majority of the National Guard soldiers deployed have received positive support from their employers. However, they too have a responsibility to their customers and ultimately stock holders. The inability of predictability over an extended period of time could have a negative impact on the Employer Support of the Guard Reserve (ESGR).

The soldiers of today's 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division are not unlike those who served their nation during World War I and II. The 36<sup>th</sup> Division like other Army National Guard units has a proud heritage. They realize that their traditions were founded on the concept of the "minuteman militia" some 368 years ago and will continue to defend the United States' Constitution against all enemies foreign or domestic throughout the twenty-first century.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Davis, Jose R, *Army National Guard Readiness: Transforming to Meet The Challenges of The Twenty-First Century*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 19 March 2004), 1.

<sup>2</sup> George W. Bush, Remarks at the signing of FY 02 Defense Appropriations Bill, 10 January 2002, Washington, D.C.

<sup>3</sup> Department of the Army, *The Army Vision*, available from <[www.army.mil/vision](http://www.army.mil/vision)>; Internet; accessed 23 August 2004.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, September 30, 2001), 17.

<sup>8</sup> Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.; The Pentagon, May 2004), 18.

<sup>9</sup> Peter J. Schoomaker, *United States Army 2004 Posture Statement* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, February 5, 2004), 1.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Robert F. Reel, *Abrams Doctrine Revisited – Letter to Editor*, available from <[http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOIBY/is\\_2-80/ai\\_114698888](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOIBY/is_2-80/ai_114698888)>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2004.

<sup>12</sup> Schoomaker, 2004 Posture Statement, 14.

<sup>13</sup> Army National Guard, *Constitutional Charter of the Guard*, available from <<http://www.arng.army.mil/history/Constitution>>, Internet; accessed 20 October 2004.

<sup>14</sup> National Guard Bureau, *“An Overview of The National Guard – America’s State and Federal Military Force”* (Washington, D.C.: May 2004).

<sup>15</sup> H. Steven Blum, *Executive Summary*, National Guard 2005 Posture Statement (Washington, D.C. National Guard Bureau), 6.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 8-22.

<sup>17</sup> John Bonin, “Modular Army Overview: Designing a Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 23 November 2004.

<sup>18</sup> Lee Schnell, "36th Infantry Division UEx/UA COA Decision," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Camp Mabry, Austin, TX: November 2004.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>21</sup> George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 2002), 2.

<sup>22</sup> John Bonin, "Army Theater Capabilities," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Carlisle, Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 27 February 2005.

<sup>23</sup> Blum, 2005 Posture Statement, 3.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 8.

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